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Summary. This article reconstructs the history of China’s first successful cinchona cultivation pro-
gramme in Hekou, Yunnan province from the 1930s to 1940s during the Nationalist era (1928–49).
I argue that the Hekou programme was initiated by the Yunnan ‘local developmental state’ to con-
trol endemic malaria and achieve quinine self-sufficiency. It was expanded during the Sino-
Japanese War (1937–45) as part of the national defence project in order to develop Yunnan’s
malaria-ridden southwest frontier to provide more resources for the war, as well as to solve broader
wartime epidemic crises in southwest China. A closer examination also indicates that the develop-
ment of the Hekou programme was closely intertwined with global networks of cinchona cultiva-
tion and international politics.
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In its third issue published in late spring of 1937, the leading Chinese scientific journal
Kexue excitedly reported that, Hekou County Experimental Farm for Tropical Plants in
China’s southwest Yunnan Province, for the first time in Chinese history, had successfully
cultivated several hundreds of cinchona trees.1 The breaking news was soon broadcast
around China, as cinchona, containing the effective antimalarial alkaloid quinine in its
bark,2 was one of the most valuable medicinal plants in the world. Moreover, it was very
difficult to cultivate cinchona outside the plant’s native Andean regions of South
America, and previously, only a few Euro-American countries and Japan had achieved
cinchona cultivations. With the success of Hekou Farm led by Yunnan Provincial
Commissioner of Reconstruction Zhang Banghan (1885–1958), China finally had its own
cinchona trees, just like those Western powers.3
Based on the primary sources from the Yunnan Provincial Archives, this article explores
the origin, development and demise of China’s first successful cinchona cultivation
programme in Hekou, which lasted mainly from the 1930s to the 1940s. It argues
that the Hekou case does not neatly fit the current dormant colonial paradigm of
the history of cinchona, in which cinchona (and quinine) was regarded as a ‘tool of
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empire’,4 and cinchona cultivation as an ‘imperial science’5 or a ‘colonial botany’6 for
Euro-American and Japanese imperial expansion and colonial rule in their malaria-ridden
tropical colonies.
As its Western counterparts, the Hekou cinchona cultivation programme was not a
pure scientific agricultural experiment, but it served for more complicated political and
economic purposes rather than a simple colonial or imperial project: it was initiated in
the early 1930s by Zhang Banghan and his colleagues, in order to control endemic ma-
laria and save national revenue for building Yunnan governor and warlord Long Yun’s
(1884–1962) ‘local developmental state’, which resembled the technocratic central gov-
ernment of Nationalist China (1928–49). After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War
(1937–45), the Hekou programme was incorporated into the Chinese national defence
project. In a certain form of ‘internal colonialism’, it was then advanced to develop
Yunnan’s semi-autonomous and malaria-ridden southwest frontiers to provide more
resources for wartime needs. For another, together with other state-led bioprospecting
programmes, it was also promoted by the central government to solve broader wartime
epidemic crisis in Southwest China. In addition, the war played a key role in destabilising
the Hekou programme. A closer examination on its integrations into Yunnan’s local state
building and Chinese national defence projects also indicates that the Hekou programme
was intertwined with global networks of cinchona cultivation and international politics.
The Local Developmental State, Malaria and Yunnan Initiatives
Cinchona barks were brought to China by Jesuit missionaries in 1693 in order to cure
Kangxi (r. 1661–1722), the second emperor of Qing China who suffered a serious malar-
ial fever. For the next hundred years, the knowledge and application of cinchona barks
gradually spread beyond the imperial court.7 Since the mid-nineteenth century, isolated
quinine pills had also been introduced and widely used in China along with European im-
perial expansions.8 Recognising the medicinal and economic importance of the plant,
some Chinese initiatives had attempted to cultivate cinchona in several southern Chinese
provinces during the 1920s, but all of them had failed. It was not until 1935 that cin-
chona trees were successfully cultivated in Hekou County Experimental Farm for Tropical
Plants, which was initiated by Zhang Banghan and his colleague Huang Riguang of the
Yunnan Commission of Reconstruction.
4Daniel Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and
European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).
5Richard Drayton, Nature’s Government: Science,
Imperial Britain, and the ‘Improvement’ of the World
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).
6Londa Schiebinger and Claudia Swan, eds, Colonial
Botany: Science, Commerce, and Politics in the Early
Modern World (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2005).
7Zhao Xuemin, Bencao gangmu shiyi (Supplements to
Systematic Materia Medica) (1765. Reprint. Beijing:
Renmin weisheng chubanshe, 1963), 208; J. W.
Stephens, ‘Pates Medicinales and Quinquina: The
Treatment of K’ang Hsi, Emperor of China’, Journal of
Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, 1937, 40, 187–88;
Wang Jiming, ‘Guanyu jinji’na chuanru woguo de
jizai’, Zhonghua yishi zazhi, 1954, 6, 28–31; Marta
Hanson, ‘Jesuits and Medicine in the Kangxi Court
(1662–1722)’, Pacific Rim Report, 2007, 43, 1–10.
8For the history of quinine and its global spread, see
Andreas-Holger Maehle, Drugs on Trial: Experimental
Pharmacology and Therapeutic Innovation in the
Eighteenth Century (Amsterdam and Atlanta: Editions
Rodopi B. V., 1999), 223–309; James L. A. Webb, Jr.,
Humanity’s Burden: A Global History of Malaria (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 92–126. On
the introduction and consumption of quinine in China
in the nineteeth and twentieth centuries, see Yubin
Shen, ‘Malaria and Global Networks of Tropical
Medicine in Modern China, 1919–1950’ (unpublished
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The Yunnan Commission of Reconstruction led by Zhang Banghan was a crucial part
of the provincial administration of warlord Long Yun’s ‘local developmental state’. The
term ‘developmental state’ was originally used by Chalmers Johnson to describe the
Japanese state’s regulation and planning in Japan’s economic development.9 By applying
this concept into modern Chinese history, scholars have already demonstrated that
Nationalist China (1928–49) was an embryonic developmental state run by techno-
crats.10 Following its founder Sun Yat-sen’s (1866–1925) developmentalist plans,11 the
Nationalist government appropriated the technocratic authority to legitimate its develop-
mental policies in water control and national reconstruction.12 Some recent studies have
already moved to look at local state building carried out by provincial authorities,13 such
as warlord Chen Jitang (1890–1954) of Guangdong province in South China, who relied
on agricultural experts to carry out his local developmental state project of the sugar in-
dustry.14 Long Yun ruled Yunnan in a manner consistent with his Guangdong counter-
part. After he took control of this province in 1927, Long Yun called for ‘reconstructing a
new Yunnan’ and established several new and effective economic, military, educational
and public health institutions, including the Yunnan Commission of Reconstruction,15
and China’s first provincial governmental agency specifically designed to combat en-
demic malaria, the Yunnan Anti-Malaria Commission (YAMC) in 1939.16
Zhang Banghan was a lifelong disciple of Sun Yat-sen and a strong political supporter
of Long Yun. Originally from Yunnan, Zhang joined Sun Yat-sen’s Anti-Qing
Revolutionary Alliance in 1906. He was then sent by Sun to study in Europe in 1909 and
later received a Belgian diploma in Electrical Engineering. After the establishment of the
9Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle:
The Growth of Industrial Policy,1925–1975
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982).
10William Kirby, ‘Engineering China: Birth of the
Developmental State, 1928-37’, in Wen-hsin Yeh,
ed., Becoming Chinese: Passages to Modernity and
Beyond, 1900–1950 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2000), 137–60. Also see William C.
Kirby, ‘The Nationalist Regime and the Chinese
Party-State, 1928–1959’, in Merle Goldman and
Andrew Gordon, eds, Contemporary East Asia in
Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2000), 211–37.
11For more about Sun Yat-sen and his technocratic and
developmentalist ideas, see Mariko Takegami, Man
obu saiensu son bun: Shisoshiteki kosatsu (Tokyo:
Keisoshobo, 2014).
12Seiichiro Yoshizawa used the development state and
Ju¨rgen Habermas’s ‘technology and science as ideol-
ogy’ to discuss the Nationalists’ plan of reconstruct-
ing the Northwest region. See Seiichiro Yoshizawa,
‘Nankin kokumin seifu to seihoku kensetsu’, Gendai
Chugoku Kenkyu, 2006, 29, 18–28; on water control
such as Huai River hydraulics, see David A. Pietz,
Engineering the State: The Huai River and
Reconstruction in Nationalist China, 1927–1937
(New York: Routledge, 2002). Kenneth Pomeranz re-
cently stated that the developmentalism of the
Chinese political economy could be traced back at
least as far back as the late imperial period in the
1500s. See Kenneth Pomeranz, ‘The Transformation
of the China’s Environment, 1500–2000’, in Edmund
Burke III and Kenneth Pomeranz, eds, The
Environment and World History (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 2009), 118–64.
13One theoretical example is Elizabeth J. Remick,
Building Local States: China during the Republican
and Post-Mao Eras (Cambridge: Harvard University
Asia Center, 2004).
14Emily M. Hill, Smokeless Sugar: The Death of a
Provincial Bureaucrat and the Construction of China’s
National Economy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010).
15Xie Benshu, Long Yun zhuan (Chengdu: Sichuan
minzu chubanshe, 1988), 94–116. For example, the
Yunnan Economic Committee led by the technocrat
Miao Jiaming (1894–1988) successfully accomplished
a certain level of industrialisation and provided suffi-
cient financial support for Long Yun’s regime by de-
veloping and innovating Yunnan’s economic and
mining sections with modern technology. See J. C. S.
Hall, The Yunnan Provincial Faction, 1927–1937
(Canberra: Department of Far Eastern History,
Australian National University, 1976).
16On the YAMC (1939–45) as part of the Yunnan local
developmental state, see Yubin Shen, ‘Malaria and
Global Networks of Tropical Medicine in Modern
China, 1919–1950’ (unpublished PhD thesis,
Georgetown University, 2017), 123–84.
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Nationalist regime in Nanjing in 1928, Zhang was appointed by Long Yun as the
Provincial Commissioner of Reconstruction, a position he would hold until 1945.17
During his tenure, Zhang avidly sought to realise Sun and Long’s developmentalist ideas.
In a special issue of the journal Chinese Reconstruction (Zhonguo jianshe) in 1934, Zhang
elaborated his reconstruction plans for Yunnan, including promotion of modern farming
and afforestation, as well as building modern transportation, hydraulic works and elec-
tricity systems. Considering the sub-tropical and tropical environmental conditions in
south Yunnan, he proposed there should be farms for tropical cash crops, such as coffee,
tung trees and plantains.18
His interest in agriculture and forestry was not exceptional. During the early twentieth
century, many intellectuals and officials believed that in order to save China, it would be
necessary to modernise Chinese agriculture and afforestation using the science of for-
estry.19 Since he did not know much about forestry himself, Zhang turned to Huang
Riguang. Huang had graduated from the National Institute of Agriculture in Paris, and in
1924, he became a professor and chair of the experimental farm at the College of
Agriculture of the newly established Guangdong University. The College of Agriculture,
formerly an independent Guangdong Provincial Agricultural School, was incorporated
into the university by Sun Yat-sen, who was convinced of the importance of modern agri-
culture, in order to build a strong focus on agriculture to ensure a better Chinese liveli-
hood.20 It soon became one of the leading agricultural colleges in China, especially
famous for forestry.21 In this particular college, Huang established himself as an expert
on agriculture and tropical plants.22 Invited by Zhang, Huang went to Yunnan in 1928 to
serve as director of the Forest Section in the Commission of Reconstruction.23
Both as technocrats trained in Europe, Zhang Banghan and Huang Riguang believed
that by using modern scientific methods and rational management styles, they could
more efficiently develop Yunnan. In the years that followed, they set up several institutes
for the improvement of rice production, sericulture, tobacco, cotton, animal husbandry,
tea, pest control and trees that could be grown for profit. They also established a
provincial-wide system of tree farms for the purpose of afforesting Yunnan.24
It was Huang who first persuaded Zhang to cultivate cinchona trees in Yunnan.25
As early as 1924 back in Guangdong University, he had acquired dozens of cinchona
seeds from overseas Chinese contacts in the Dutch Java, the dominant cinchona planter
17Xiang Guoxiang, Cai Yongshu and Liu Pingshan,
‘Zhang Banhan zhuanlue’, Zhenxiong wenshi ziliao,
1983, 1, 102–05.
18Zhang Banghan, ‘Yunnan sheng jianshe zhuanhao’,
Zhongguo jianshe, 1934, 8, 85–100.
19Hill, Smokeless Sugar, 21. For a similar discussion on
modern agricultural science in China, see Randall
Stross, The Stubborn Earth: American Agriculturalists
on Chinese Soil, 1898–1937 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1986). E. Elena Songster,
‘Cultivating the Nation in Fujian’s Forests: Forest
Policies and Afforestation Efforts in China, 1911–
1937’, Environmental History, 2003, 8, 452–73.
20After the death of Sun, the university was renamed
as Sun Yat-sen University in 1926. Deng Zhiyi, ‘Lun
nongxueyuan zhi guoqu yu jianglai’, Nong shen yue-
kan, 1933, 171, 1.
21Luo Shiming et al., Hua’nan nongye daxue xiaoshi
(Guangzhou: Guangdong keji chubanshe, 1999).
22In 1940, Huang published the first monograph on
tropical plantations in China. See Huang Riguang,
Zhongguo redai zuowu (Changshan: Shangwu yin-
shuguan, 1940).
23Huang Riguang, ‘Yunnan zhi nong lin jianshe’, Nong
shen yuekan 1940, 215, 13–20.
24Zhang Banghan, ‘Yunnan sheng zhi nongye jianshe’,
Zhong nong yuekan, 1943, 4, 59–64.
25Yunnan Provincial Archives (hereafter, YPA), 77-23-
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and supplier in the world. He started experimenting on the college farm but unfortu-
nately failed in his attempts.26 Huang convinced Zhang of the importance of continuing
his cinchona cultivation effort in Yunnan, using three major arguments: First, Yunnan,
particularly its southwest frontier, had been a notoriously malaria-ridden region. At that
time, over 10,000 patients died from malaria every year in Yunnan due to the shortage
of quinine supplies. For example, Simao, a prosperous regional commercial centre in
southwestern Yunnan, fell victim to a devastating malaria epidemic in 1919, lasting
nearly 30 years. As a result, in 1927, its population had dropped from 76,800 to 24,106.
After that, the population continued to decrease: in 1935, only 4,000 survivors lived
there, and in 1953, Simao became little more than a ghost town, with only 1,092 resi-
dents.27 Thus, cultivating cinchona (to produce quinine) would save people’s lives,28 pro-
vide healthier labourers for Long Yun’s local developmental state and help strengthen his
ruling legitimacy.
The second argument was saving national revenue. Malaria was endemic not only in
Yunnan but also throughout China’s southern provinces. Zhang and Huang pointed out
that 8–10 tons of quinine pills were imported from overseas every year, resulting in a
huge loss of government funds. What is worse, the quantities of imported quinine were
only sufficient to meet the needs of less than one-third of the total malarial patients in
China, but increasing the import threefold would have meant yet more expense.29
According to another calculation in the 1930s, around 16 tons of quinine would have
been required in order to treat all of the malarial sufferers in Yunnan. And throughout all
of China, the total demand for cinchona bark, not to mention quinine products, was
around 2 million jin (100 tons) every year, which would have amounted to a cost for the
government of 150 million Chinese dollars (Table 1).30
The idea of achieving autarky and building China’s national economy was widely ac-
cepted by officials in their national reconstruction projects.31 Zhang and Huang were
among those technocrats who believed in these principles. They could not abide the fact
that China was obliged to pay out huge sums for quinine imports, and thus, they planned
to cultivate cinchona trees to save government expenditure, achieve quinine self-
Table 1 Quinine imports in China from the Dutch East Indies, 1935–39
Year 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
Quantity (metric ton) 70 79 38 32 65
Source: From Nihon Yushutsu Nosanbutsu Kabushiki Kaisha, Beikoku o nayamasu fusoku shigen kina ni
tsuite (Tokyo, 1942), 34.
26Jiangsu sheng Tao Xingzhi yanjiu hui, ed., Tao
Xingzhi rizhi (Nanjing: Jiangsu jiaoyu chubanshe,
1991), 265.
27Zheng Zuyou, ‘Yunnan nueji liuxing lishi ji diaoyan
qingkuang’, in Zhengxie Yunnan sheng weiyuanhui
wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui, ed., Yunnan wenshi
ziliao xuanji 35 (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chu-
banshe, 1989), 249–71.
28Huang Riguang, ‘Yunnan zhi nong lin jianshe’, Nong
shen yuekan, 1940, 215, 13.
29YPA, 77-23-76, ‘Yunnan Hekou tuiguang zhongzhi
jinji’na shu ji shiyan jihua shu, Jan 2, 1940’.
30Liang Guangshang, Jinji’na shu zhi zaipei yu yongtu
(Shanghai: Zhengzhong shuju, 1946), 81.
31Margherita Zanasi, Saving the Nation: Economic
Modernity in Republican China (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 2006).
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sufficiency, and possibly, in the process, gain considerable profits for the Chinese nation
and the Yunnan local developmental state in the future.32
The final reason had to do with the fact that Yunnan possessed a potentially favour-
able climate and environment for growing cinchona trees. Cinchona with its strict envi-
ronmental requirements is perhaps one of the most difficult plants to cultivate.
According to contemporary Western scientific experts, cinchona trees with a high pro-
portion of quinine would only grow at latitudes from 10 north to 20 south, at altitudes
from 1,200 to 2,000 m, with average temperatures from 18C to 22C, annual rainfall
from 2.5 to 3.5 m, with little monthly variation and humus-rich soil.33 Although
Yunnan’s latitudes were from 20 to 28 north, taking into consideration its particular
tropical climate and soil conditions, Zhang and Huang believed that cinchona trees could
be cultivated in the province’s south and southwest malaria-ridden regions.34
Global Botanical Networks and Cinchona Cultivation in Yunnan
When Zhang Banghan and Huang Riguang started their cinchona programme in Yunnan
in the 1930s, the first difficult task for them was to acquire cinchona seeds. Educated in
Europe, they recognised that there were already extensive global botanical networks of
cinchona cultivation in place they could turn to.
Global botanical cinchona cultivation networks were initiated by the British and Dutch
empires in the mid-nineteenth century, joined later by other imperial powers who also
participated in cinchona cultivation for their own specific colonial agendas.35 British colo-
nial botanists and naturalists, such as Clements R. Markham and Richard Spruce, began
to smuggle cinchona seeds out of South America and cultivated the plants in India in the
1850s, in order to safeguard British imperial enterprise in this malaria-ridden colony and
to save huge expenditures on importing cinchona barks from South America. With sup-
port from the British Indian government and Kew Botanic Gardens, in a ‘global network
of exploration collection and systematisation of botanical knowledge’,36 cinchona was
successfully cultivated in places like the Nilgiri Hills in British India in the 1860s. After
that, through Kew Garden’s ‘global reach and its connections with state power’ and its
branch botanical gardens in various British colonies (including the Calcutta Botanic
Garden in Bengal, which would play an important role in Yunnan’s cinchona cultivation),
many cinchona plantations were established in India, East Africa, the Caribbean, Ceylon
(Sri Lanka) and Burma.37
At almost the same time, in the 1850s, the Dutch government also started cinchona
cultivation efforts in the Netherlands East Indies, particularly in Java, which boasted a
32YPA, 77-23-76, ‘Yunnan Hekou tuiguang zhongzhi
jinji’na shu ji shiyan jihua shu, January 2, 1940’.
33Lin Xixun, ‘Yunnan zhi jinji’na’, Nong Shen, 1942,
225, 82–83.
34YPA, 77-23-76, ‘Yunnan jianshe ting zhongzhi jinji’na
zhi shikuang, 1940’.
35For a general introduction on worldwide cinchona
cultivation, see Liang Ruxiang, ‘Jinji’na zhi yanjiu’,
Nong bao, 1947, 12, 34.
36Kavita Philip, ‘Imperial Science Rescues a Tree: Global
Botanic Networks, Local Knowledge and the
Transcontinental Transplantation of Cinchona’,
Environment and History, 1995, 1, 173–200.
37Lucile H. Brockway, Science and Colonial Expansion:
The Role of the British Royal Botanic Gardens (New
York: Academic Press, 1979), 103–39. Also see
Donovan Williams, ‘Clements Robert Markham and the
Introduction of the Cinchona Tree into British India,
1861’, The Geographical Journal, 1962, 128, 431–442;
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similar topography and climate to South America. Under the direction of colonial scien-
tists such as Franz Junghuhn and K. W. van Gorkom and with the Dutch government’s
support, cinchona plantations in Java experienced rapid development. They began to en-
joy huge economic profits, especially after 1872 when Charles Ledger’s seeds (Cinchona
ledgeriana) were widely planted in Java.38 From 1890 onwards and up until 1940, the
Netherlands East Indies gradually replaced British India and dominated the cinchona bark
trade, by providing more than 90 per cent of the world’s supply.39
The French started their cinchona cultivation experiments in 1848 but soon faced fail-
ure. In 1869, seeds of cinchona trees were transported from Java to Saigon Botanic
Garden in French Indochina. After several major failures in the five decades that followed,
led by the famous bacteriologist Alexandre Yersin (1863–1943) of the Pasteur Institute in
Saigon, cinchona trees were finally successfully cultivated in the 1920s in southern
Vietnam.40 The German cinchona project was initiated in 1900 in the colony Tanganyika
of East Africa, while the Americans cultivated cinchona trees in the Philippines in 1927.41
The Japanese Empire opened its own cinchona cultivation plan in the 1880s and suc-
ceeded in 1922 in its tropical colony Taiwan.42
The Yunnan initiatives understood that the global networks were of an imperial and
colonial nature, but still, they struggled to take advantage of them. At first they tried to
get cinchona seeds from Java, but for reasons still not clear, the Dutch colonial govern-
ment seemed to have placed strict restrictions on the exportation of cinchona seeds to
the Chinese in the early 1930s.43 After several failed attempts, in 1932, Zhang turned to
Henry Forster Handley-Derry (1879–1966), the British consular official in Yunnan.
Handley-Derry agreed to help Zhang and managed to purchase eight ounces of cinchona
seeds from Java and Calcutta.44 Huang distributed some of these seeds to Lufeng Forest
Farm,45 south of Yunnan’s capital Kunming, for a cultivation experiment, but they all
died fairly soon. The rest of the seeds were sent to the Hekou Experimental Farm for
38Andrew Goss, The Floracrats: State-Sponsored
Science and the Failure of the Enlightenment in
Indonesia (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
2011), 33–58.
39Andrew Goss, ‘Building the World’s Supply of
Quinine: Dutch Colonialism and the Origins of a
Global Pharmaceutical Industry’, Endeavour, 2014,
38, 8. On the different historical trajectories of cin-
chona plantations in the Dutch and British empires,
see Arjo Roersch van der Hoogte and Toine Pieters,
‘Science in the Service of Colonial Agro-industrialism:
The Case of Cinchona Cultivation in the Dutch and
British East Indies, 1852–1900’, Studies in History
and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical
Sciences, 2014, 47, 12–22.
40Xixun, ‘Yunnan zhi jinji’na’, 81–82; A. Yersin et A.
Lambert, Essais d’Acclimatation de L’arbre a quin-
quina en Indochine (Hanoi: Imprimerie D’Extreme-
orient, 1931), 5–11.
41Jiao Qiyuan, ‘Jinji’na shuang shu ji qita zhi nue zhi
yaoyong zhiwu’, Xi’nan shiye tongxun, 1942, 5, 18.
42Nagumo Seiji, ‘Kina no kokunai saibai ni kansuru
shiteki kenkyu’, Yakugaku Zasshi, 2011, 131,
1527–1543; Ya-wen Ku, ‘Rizhi shiqi Taiwan de jin-
ji’na shu zaipei yu kui’ning zhiyao’, Taiwan shi yanjiu,
2011, 18, 47–91.
43According to Norman Taylor, it was not until 1937
that the Dutch colonial government began to em-
bargo cinchona seeds, and before that many coun-
tries successfully purchased cinchona seeds from
Java. See Norman Taylor, Cinchona in Java: The Story
of Quinine (New York: Greenberg, 1945), 77–78.
Also see Tanaka Chozaburo, Nanpo shokusan shigen
ron (Tokyo: Yokendo, 1943).
44Tao Xingzhi rishi, 265.
45Lufeng Farm was the oldest tree farm in modern
Yunnan, dating back to 1904. See Li Ronggao,
‘Yunnan minguo shiqi linchang kao’, Nongye kaogu,
2003, 1, 172. For more about the history of agricul-
tural experiment stations in early twentieth-century
China, see Peter Lavelle, ‘Agricultural Improvement
at China’s First Agricultural Experiment Stations’, in
Denise Philips and Sharon Kingsland, eds, New
Perspectives on the History of Life Sciences and
Agriculture (Springer, 2015), 323–344.
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Tropical Plants in Hekou County along the southwest borderland. Surprisingly, they grew
very well, and the young plants soon began to leaf out. But the director of Hekou Farm,
Zhang Jiliang, noticed that the leaves were completely different from the phyllotaxy of
cinchona as described in textbooks. At that time, the famous American explorer and bot-
anist Joseph Rock46 (1884–1962) was travelling in Yunnan. Huang Riguang asked him to
examine the plants. The results were very striking: these plants turned out to be ficus
(banyan), not cinchona at all! There were two possible explanations for this mix-up: ei-
ther the suppliers had given ficus seeds in the first place, or the cinchona seeds had been
stolen and replaced with ficus mid-journey somewhere in Vietnam. Whatever the expla-
nation, this further supports indication that obtaining cinchona seeds was still not an
easy task.
In the winter of 1933, Handley-Derry once again purchased eight ounces of cinchona
seeds for Yunnan initiatives from the Calcutta Botanical Garden. This time, he carefully
packed and delivered them in secure diplomatic bags, and Yunnan project finally
obtained authentic cinchona seeds.47 Cinchona seeds from Calcutta were all brought to
the Hekou Experimental Farm for Tropical Plants for cultivation. This farm was established
in 1930 mainly for planting urban street trees,48 and in 1933, it was reorganised for
experimenting with tropical plants such as coconuts, bananas and coffee.49 Zhang
Banghan and his colleagues understood that the Hekou farm was not the perfect place
to grow cinchona. The soil there was sandy loam, and its altitude was only 100 meters,
which did not meet some of the critical requirements for cinchona cultivation. However,
located on the border between Yunnan and Vietnam, it was the southernmost state-
controlled farm and the only available one that was located around the latitude of 20
north in Yunnan. What is more, Hekou had certain climatic advantages that might favour
the growth of cinchona trees, such as an average temperature above 21C. For these
reasons, the Yunnan initiatives still considered it to be worth a try.50
There was another possible advantage for cultivating cinchona trees at the Hekou
Farm: the director and staff, trained as professional forestry experts, were strongly deter-
mined to transform Yunnan through means of modern agricultural science. The director,
Zhang Jiliang, graduated from the School of Agriculture, Guangdong University, with a
specialism in forestry.51 Lin Yongxin, the deputy director, was also an alumnus from that
college. As Lin recalled years later, ‘to cultivate cinchona trees to save the patients’ lives’,
they were ‘resolute in their determination’.52 Since ‘the foreigners kept the knowledge
of cinchona cultivation as secrets’, they had little practical information or experience in
cultivating this unfamiliar plant.53 They attempted to sow cinchona seeds eight times,
but the trees all failed to sprout. Zhang Banghan encouraged them by citing the example
of the drug Salvarsan, experiments with which had failed 606 times before this magic
46For more about Joseph Rock’s botanic adventures in
Yunnan, see Erik Mueggler, The Paper Road: Archive
and Experience in the Botanical Exploration of West
China and Tibet (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2011).
47Xixun, ‘Yunnan zhi jinji’na’, 82–83; Yongxin,
‘Yunnan sheng Hekou shizhi jinji’na zhi jinguo’, 56.
48‘Yunnan sheng jianshe zhuanhao’, 101–02.
49YPA, 77-9-1502, ‘Hekou redai zuowu shiyanchang,
1940’.
50Yongxin, ‘Yunnan sheng Hekou shizhi jinji’na zhi jin-
guo’, 56–57.
51YPA, 77-1-247, ‘Gongwu renyuan zhenbie biao:
Zhang Jiliang’.
52Yongxin, ‘Yunnan sheng hekou shizhi jinji’na zhi jin-
guo’, 64.
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bullet against syphilis was created.54 On the ninth try, Zhang Jiliang and his staff in
Hekou experimented with a technological innovation: they planted the seeds in boxes,
and they finally germinated. Over 1,800 young plants were then successfully trans-
planted to the hills of the Hekou Farm. After 1936, they were even able to sow the seeds
obtained from cinchona trees growing in the Hekou Farm itself.55 This piece of news was
soon broadcast around China, and Zhang Banghan and Hekou Farm became well-
known in China’s scientific and medical circles. It was widely believed that following the
Hekou model, the Chinese would continue ‘acclimating cinchona trees to Chinese
environments’.56
In the next years, Yunnan continued to acquire cinchona seeds through the global bo-
tanical networks. In 1939, the French government presented them with cinchona seeds
as gifts.57 In 1940, the British consulate sent them seeds of red cinchona (Cinchona suc-
cirubra).58 The American consulate offered 5.6 g of three different types of cinchona
seeds in 1942.59 By the 1940s, Yunnan had become part of the global network of cin-
chona cultivation.
Cultivating Cinchona for the War: Developing the Pusi Frontier and
Bioprospecting Anti-Malarial Drugs
The Yunnan state-building technocrats were not satisfied with their minor success in
Hekou. They drafted ambitious plans to cultivate millions of cinchona trees in the provin-
ce’s southwest region or the Pusi frontier, which seemed to boast more suitable land at
higher altitudes. After the outbreak of the second Sino-Japanese war in 1937, two new
motivations pushed them to put some of their plans into practice.
The first one was developing Yunnan’s Pusi frontier to supply resources and food for
wartime needs. After the outbreak of the war, the Nationalist central government
retreated to southwest China to ensure its survival. Over one million refugees from
Japanese-occupied areas fled to Yunnan. To support the war and the huge population, it
was critical to stimulate Yunnan’s economy further to provide more food and resour-
ces.60 As Long Yun claimed in a speech on the relationship between the war and devel-
oping Yunnan, the province boasted rich resources, such as water power and
‘uncultivated wasteland’, which could be better utilised to achieve final victory against
the Japanese.61
Among these ‘fertile wastelands’, Pusi was regarded as ‘the perfect cultivable land for
agriculture’,62 but it was a challenging mission to develop this ‘disobedient and danger-
ous’ frontier. The Pusi frontier was part of the so-called Zomia region, where non-Han
54Tao Xingzhi rishi, 265.
55YPA, 77-23-76, ‘Yunnan jianshe ting zhongzhi jin-
ji’na zhi shikuang, 1940’.
56Xixun, ‘Yunnan zhi jinji’na’, 83.
57YPA, 77-11-1967, ‘Hekou zuowu shiyanchang shiz-
hong gezhong jinji zuowu zhongmiao laiwang
feiyong kaizhi’.
58YPA, 77-9-966-02, ‘Yunnan sheng jianshe ting Yi’xi
redai zuowu shiyanchang 39 niandu gongzuo
baogao’.
59YPA, 77-32-51, ‘Yi’xi redai zuowu shiyanchang wenti
baogao, November 2, 1942’.
60A similar case of land reclamation and wartime refu-
gees in Shanxi province, see Micah S. Muscolino,
‘Refugees, Land Reclamation, and Militarized
Landscapes in Wartime China: Huanglongshan,
Shaanxi, 1937–45’, The Journal of Asian Studies,
2010, 69, 453–78.
61Long Yun, ‘Changqi kangzhan yu kaifa Yunnan zhi
guanxi xing’, Yunnan sheng zhengfu gongbao,
1939, 11, 24–25.
62Jiang Yingliang, Sipu yanbian kaifa fang’an
(Kunming: Yunnan sheng minzheng ting bianjiang
xingzheng sheji weiyuanhui, 1945), 34.
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indigenous regimes had maintained semi-autonomy away from the Chinese central gov-
ernment for hundreds of years.63 Ever since the late eighteenth century, the Qing gov-
ernment had substantially expanded its state power by transforming some of these local
chieftainships into direct administrations and encouraging move ‘sophisticated’ Han
Chinese peasants into this area to cultivate the land.64 However, the Pusi frontier was no-
torious for its serious malaria endemicity. As some scholars have pointed out, while the
local ethnic Tai people were able to survive, having developed a hard-won resistance
against malarial parasites, for most of the newly arrived Han Chinese immigrants, the dis-
ease had fatal consequences. This was the land where ‘no Han could go for long’.65 Such
a long-term disease frontier environment had been maintained during the 1930s and
1940s, which posed a critical obstacle to the proposed cultivation plans of Long Yun’s lo-
cal developmental state.66
The solution for eliminating malaria in Pusi frontier was to move more Han Chinese to
reclaim land there during the Qing period. Republican intellectuals and officials held a
similar view: ‘. . . there is a mutual waning and waxing relation between reclamation and
malaria . . . if more people move in, and all wastelands are reclaimed, malaria endemicity
will just go away’.67 It was similar as the ‘bonification’ measure promoted by European
malariologists in the late 1920s, which ‘signified all work carried out with the object of
making regions that are periodically or permanently marshy more healthy and more suit-
able for agriculture’, as the drainage and filling of swamps could eliminate breeding pla-
ces of the malarial mosquitoes.68
After cinchona trees were successfully cultivated in Hekou, republican technocrats be-
gan to view cinchona tree plantations together with Han Chinese agricultural immigra-
tion as the best solution to develop the Pusi Frontier.69 Huang Riguang elaborated this
point in a public lecture at Yunnan University in 1939: promoting the cultivation of cin-
chona was ‘the pioneering solution for reclaiming the malarial region’, since cinchona
could protect Han Chinese immigrants against endemic malaria. For Huang, it became
necessary to transplant cinchona trees in the counties of the Pusi frontier beyond
63James Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An
Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).
64C. Patterson Giersch, Asian Borderlands: The
Transformation of Qing China’s Yunnan Frontier
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006); David
Bello, Across Forest, Steppe, and Mountain:
Environment, Identity, and Empire in Qing China’s
Borderlands (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2016), 169–218.
65For the still controversial statement of the Tai peo-
ple’s malaria resistance, see David Bello, ‘To Go
Where No Han Could Go for Long: Malaria and the
Qing Construction of Ethnic Administrative Space in
Frontier Yunnan’, Modern China, 2005, 31, 283–
317. See also ‘The League of Nations Anti-Epidemic
Work in China in 1939’, Bulletin of the Health
Organization, 1940/41, 3, 256. In 1941, the Yunnan
Anti-Malaria Commission conducted an investigation
on such issue and found that the local Tai people
were indeed more resistant to malaria, compared
with the Han Chinese; see Zhou Yimin, ‘Xunhui
kangnue dui zai Yuanjiang xian zhi gongzuo gai-
kuang’, Yunnan weisheng, 1942, 12, 10. For a re-
cent study on indigenous resistance to malaria in
Africa, see James L. A. Webb, The Long Struggle
Against Malaria in Tropical Africa (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2014), 45–68.
66Even today, the southwest frontier/borderland has
been still ‘considered’ as a certain site of disease
emergence. See Sandra Teresa Hyde, Eating Spring
Rice: The Cultural Politics of AIDS in Southwest China
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).
67Jiang Yingliang, Bianjiang xingzheng renyuan shouce
(Kunming: Yunnan sheng minzheng ting bianjiang
xingzheng sheji weiyuanhui, 1944), 53.
68League of Nations Health Organization Malaria
Commission, Principles and Methods of Antimalarial
Measures in Europe (Geneva, 1927), 84.
69Liang Guangshang, ‘Yunnan jinji’na shu zhi peizhi yu
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Hekou.70 To collect more information about the Pusi frontier, and seek suitable places
for planting cinchona trees there, Huang Riguang led the Investigating Team of the Pusi
Frontier from November 1938 to February 1939, including Yuanjiang, Ning’er, Simao,
Cheli, Fohai and Nanqiao Counties. During this trip, they left bottles of cinchona seeds
and instructed local officials to try to cultivate cinchona trees there. The major success
was achieved in Nanqiao. Zhang Jiliang brought cinchona seeds to Nanqiao Forest Farm,
finding that its altitude of 1,400 meters was more suitable for cultivating cinchona, and
thus a sub-programme was set up to cultivate cinchona there.71
The role of cinchona cultivation in developing the Pusi frontier to some extent resem-
bled Euro-American and Japanese counterparts in their tropical colonies, but more pre-
cisely, it served as ‘a tool of internal colonialism’ rather than a ‘tool of empire’. As James
Scott puts in his study on Zomia, ‘the encounter between expansionary states and self-
governing peoples’ in this region was a ‘cultural and administrative process of internal co-
lonialism that characterizes the formation of most modern Western, nation states’, which
‘involved a botanical colonization in which the landscape was transformed by deforesta-
tion, drainage, irrigation, and levees to accommodate crops, settlement patterns, and
systems of administration’.72 The promotion of cinchona cultivation in the malaria-ridden
Pusi frontier, together with Han Chinese immigrations during the wartime period, had
undeniably shaped the ‘internal colonial’ nature of the Hekou programme.
Another important motivation was the central government’s need for anti-malarial
drugs, following its retreat to malaria-infested southwest China. Even though the Allies
and international organisations provided huge amounts of quinine pills, the total demand
could not be met. There was a nation-wide, desperate search for Chinese anti-malarial
drugs that might serve as a substitute for quinine, otherwise known as ‘bio-prospec-
ting’,73 which also paralleled similar search projects undertaken elsewhere, such as in
British India and post-colonial Africa.74 The most famous case was the promotion of the
Chinese herb changshan (Dichroa febrifuga).75 After its efficacy against malaria was
proved by Chinese scientists, the Nationalist central government set up several chang-
shan cultivation projects in the 1940s.76
Nevertheless, within this context of seeking anti-malarial drugs, even more attention was
paid to China’s own cinchona trees in Yunnan. As early as 1936, the Fourth Congress of the
70Huang Riguang, ‘Yunnan shi zhong jinji’na yu kai
geng zhang qu zhi guan xi’, Yishi bao (Kunming), 16
June (Kexue fukan, no.10), 1939.
71YPA, 77-23-12, ‘Zhang Jiliang zhidao Nanqiao non-
gchang zhongzhi jinji’na, March 28, 1939’.
72Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed, 3, 12.
73Bio-prospecting is the process of searching and ex-
amining plants to obtain medicinal properties. See
Londa Schiebinger, Plants and Empire: Colonial
Bioprospecting in the Atlantic World (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2004); Londa Schiebinger
and Claudia Swan, eds, Colonial Botany: Science,
Commerce, and Politics in the Early Modern World
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005);
Abena Dove Agyepoma Osseo-Asare, Bitter Roots:
The Search for Healing Plants in Africa (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 2014); Anna
Winterbottom, Hybrid Knowledge in the Early East
India Company World (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016),
150–62.
74Pratik Chakrabarti, ‘Empire and Alternatives:
Swietenia febrifuga and the Cinchona Substitutes’,
Medical History, 2010, 54, 75–94; Abena Dove
Osseo-Asare, Bitter Roots: The Search for Healing
Plants in Africa (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 2014), 131–63.
75Sean Hsiang-lin Lei, Neither Donkey nor Horse:
Medicine in the Struggle over China’s Modernity
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2014),
193–221.
76Liu Fengxiang, ‘Woguo changshan zhongzhi shiyan’,
Nongye tongxun, 1947, 1, 23–24.
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Chinese Medical Association had already proposed that the Nationalist central government
promote cinchona cultivation in China’s tropical provinces—Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan
and Guizhou—in order to treat malaria-infested patients, to save revenue and to prepare for
a possible world war.77 In 1939, having heard the news about Hekou’s successful cinchona
cultivation, the Congress of the Chinese Medical Association sent an official letter to inquire
into the details of the Yunnan initiative’s success. The Yunnan Commission of Reconstruction
saw it as a good opportunity to attract the central government’s attention and ordered the
Hekou Farm to prepare reports of its cultivation achievements for both the Congress of the
Chinese Medical Association and the central government.
Hekou Farm also tried to gain more funding by proving that their cinchona bark con-
tained a high percentage of quinine alkaloids and was thus effective in practical treat-
ment. In November 1939, they sent several bark samples to the Army Factory of Medical
Materials, and the reports indicated that these samples contained 6.54 per cent quinine
alkaloids, which reached the minimum level of 5.4 per cent required by the United States
Pharmacopeia. In 1940, the farm sent another two samples to the Tonkin Institute of
Chemical Analysis in Vietnam, and the results were also quite promising (Table 2). During
malaria epidemics in Hekou in early 1940, they distributed some cinchona barks to local
malaria patients and collaborated with the local malaria-control station of the YAMC to
produce some quinine out of Hekou cinchona bark for malaria treatment. It was reported
that many had been cured by taking Hekou-produced bark and quinine, and the staff
proudly claimed that ‘cinchona bark from our farm is considerably useful’.78
As a result, Hekou Farm soon enjoyed a boom in the number of visitors, especially
those from the central governmental agencies, such as the Army Factory of Medical
Materials, the National Drug Research Institute and the National Military Medical School.
These visitors had been informed that the Hekou Farm could not promote massive cin-
chona cultivation due to the limited funds it received from the provincial government,
and all agreed that the central government should provide more financial support. One
of them even reported this situation back directly to Nationalist China’s highest leader at
the time, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975), who then ordered the central
government to allocate more funding in early 1940.79 It was also in 1940 that the
National Congress proposed that the central government utilise special medicines
Table 2 Dosage of alkaloids in Cinchona from Hekou farm (1940)
Cinchona species Dosage of alkaloids in 3-year-old
plants (percentage)
Dosage of alkaloids in 7-year-old
plants (percentage)
Cinchona ledgeriana 3.00 13.97
Cinchona succirubra 2.56 9.52
Cinchona malabar 1.75 7.92
Source: From Yunnan Provincial Archives, 77-23-76, ‘Yunnan jianshe ting zhongzhi jinji’na zhi shikuang’.
77YPA, 77-11-1965, ‘Quanguo yishi lianhehui zhi
quanguo jingji weiyuanhui han, 1936’.
78YPA, 77-9-966-02, ‘Yunnan jianshe ting Hekou redai
zuowu shiyanchuang 31 niandu gongzuo zong
huibao’.











ax Planck Institute for the H
istory of Science user on 04 N
ovem
ber 2019
produced in southwest China, in particular cinchona, to save more sick soldiers’ lives in
order to strengthen China’s power against the Japanese.80
As a result of all these efforts, Yunnan’s cinchona cultivation programme was incorpo-
rated into the central government’s national defence project so that they began to re-
ceive sufficient funding. In light of this support, Yunnan state-builders thus drafted an
ambitious plan, believing that there would be a promising future for their cinchona culti-
vation project: from 1941 to 1945, the Hekou Farm would cultivate millions of cinchona
trees, set up eight new cinchona farms in southwest Yunnan within 5 years and even
build a quinine factory in 1951, when there would be adequate grown cinchona trees
available. In the first year of 1941, everything was going well: the mature trees in Hekou
numbered 3,000, and there were more than 50,000 seedlings. Several new farms had al-
ready been established along the Pusi frontier, where cinchona trees had been success-
fully transplanted from Hekou (Table 3).81
However, this plan never came to fruition. After the Japanese successfully secured the
occupation of French Indochina in late 1941, Hekou became a frontline zone directly fac-
ing the Japanese military threat. Its director and main staff retreated to Kunming in the
Yunnan interior, and financial support from the central government was also cut off. As
a result, the Hekou Farm ceased to exist except in name, and its cinchona cultivation pro-
gramme was suspended in 1943 and was officially abandoned 2 years later.82 Only hun-
dred or so of the surviving cinchona trees were then handed over to a local military
garrison.83
The Hekou programme was once again restarted in 1948 by the new Yunnan gover-
nor Lu Han (1895–1974), when the Civil War (1946–49) between the Communists and
the Nationalists had already broken out.84 Soon thereafter with the Nationalist’s defeat
in 1949, the Hekou farm was taken over by the new Chinese communist regime. In
1953, the Hekou farm was transformed into a new experimental field for rubber
Table 3 Cinchona trees cultivated in Hekou farm (1941)
Location Planting time Height (m) Condition Number
Mountain field 5/1934 4 Good 377
Mountain field 5/1939 1 Good 1,560
Nursery 5/1939 none Good 32,000
Nursery 5/1940 0.1 Good 40,000
Baisa field 5/1934 6 Good 250
Source: From Yunnan Provincial Archives, 77-9-966-02, ‘Yunnan sheng jianshe ting Hekou redai zuowu
shiyanchang 31 nian 1 yue gongzuo baogao’.
80YPA, 77-23-76, ‘Yunnan sheng jianshe ting 29
niandu tuiguang zhongzhi jinji’na, sanqi, baiqiang-
kan jihua’.
81YPA, 77-9-971, ‘Yunnan sheng zhengfu jianshe ting
gongzuo baogao 1941’.
82YPA, 77-23-104, ‘Zhang Shaoxun kuaiyou dai dian,
September 14, 1943’.
83YPA, 77-23-179, ‘Yunnan sheng jianshe ting Hekou
redai zuowu shiyanchang gezhong jingfei yusuan ji
gongzuo baokao’.
84YPA, 77-23-179, ‘Yunnan sheng jianshe ting Hekou
redai zuowu shiyanchang gezhong jingfei yusuan ji
gongzuo baokao’.
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plantations to supply ‘communist’ rubber to the Soviet Union, and its cinchona cultiva-
tion programme was entirely abandoned.85
Conclusion
The past of China’s first successful cinchona cultivation programme in Hekou, Yunnan
province, has been almost totally forgotten by historians of modern China in general, not
to mention Chinese and global historians of medicine. By digging up primary archival
sources in Yunnan Provincial Archives, this article reconstructs, for the first time in any
language, the origins, developments and the demise of this cinchona cultivation pro-
gramme between the 1930s and the 1940s, which adds to our understanding of the his-
tory of the global spread of cinchona in Nationalist China.
We have gained and are still gaining an increasingly comprehensive understanding of
cinchona cultivation in Spanish, British and Dutch empires,86 but as Ya-wen Ku points
out, the East Asian context has been largely overlooked.87 In her study on Japanese cin-
chona cultivation in Taiwan, Ku demonstrates the importance of the ignored private sec-
tor in the imperial-controlled enterprise. The present article, in elaborating the close
relation between cinchona cultivation and the Chinese states (local and national), and
the cinchona programme’s paradoxical nature of anti-imperialism and internal colonial-
ism, provides another comparison in East Asia, which will also revise and make dialogues
with current dominant narratives in the global history of cinchona. The Hekou cinchona
cultivation programme was not originally a colonial/imperial project like those in Western
or Japanese empires but was initiated by technocrats in Yunnan in the 1930s to eliminate
endemic malaria, as part of local developmental state-building. Moreover, their agenda
of achieving quinine self-sufficiency against the Dutch turned out to be anti-imperialist in
nature. During the Sino-Japanese War (1937–45), the Hekou programme was integrated
into the Chinese central government’s national defence project against the Japanese im-
perialism, as well as to solve broader wartime epidemic crises in southwest China, to-
gether with other state-led, nation-wide bioprospecting programmes for medicinal
plants. However, its new reorientation to develop the semi-autonomous malaria-ridden
Pusi frontier to provide more war sources indicated that the state-led and anti-imperial
cinchona programme had ambiguously served as a tool of internal colonialism.
It also contributes to a recent scholarly interest in global histories of medicine, which
highlights the role of networks in the global spread of medical knowledge, personnel
85Yunnan sheng Hekou Yaozu Zizhixian zhi bianzuan
weiyuanhui, Hekou Yaozu zhizhixian zhi (Beijing:
Sanlian chubanshe, 1994), 213.
86Recent studies for instance include Matthew James
Crawford, The Andean Wonder Drug: Cinchona Bark
and Imperial Science in the Spanish Atlantic, 1630–
1800 (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburgh Press,
2016); Arjo Roersch van der Hoogte and Toine
Pieters, ‘Quinine, Malaria, and the Cinchona Bureau:
Marketing Practices and Knowledge Circulation in a
Dutch Transoceanic Cinchona–Quinine Enterprise
(1920s–30s)’, Journal of the History of Medicine and
Allied Sciences, 2016, 71, 197–225; and Rohan Deb
Roy, Malarial Subjects: Empire, Medicine and
Nonhumans in British India, 1820–1909 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2017).
87Ya-wen Ku, ‘The Development of Cinchona
Cultivation and ‘Kina Gaku’ in the Japanese Empire,
1912–45’, in Ts’ui-jung Liu and James John Beattie,
eds, Environment, Modernization and Development
in East Asia: Perspectives from Environmental History
(New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 157–81.
Another exception is Timothy Yang, ‘Selling an
Imperial Dream: Japanese Pharmaceuticals, National
Power, and the Science of Quinine Self-Sufficiency’,
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and objects.88 By illuminating how Yunnan local state-builders were initially rejected by
the Dutch, but later on managed to acquire cinchona seeds from British India, French
Indochina and the USA via global botanic cinchona cultivation networks, this article
draws attention to the importance of collaborations, as well as conflicts in the global his-
tory of medical networks.
Last but not the least, it contributes to ongoing revisions of Nationalist regime (1928–
49) and particularly adds to the growing body of literature on the pivotal period between
1937 and 1945—when China was at war with the Japanese—a crucial decade that has
been understudied until recently.89 They have reminded us that at both the central and
local levels, the Nationalist regime was not a total failure or ‘an abortive revolution’.90
As the history of Hekou programme indicates that there was significant progress made
even under difficult wartime circumstances and argues that setbacks in the 1940s were
primarily due to war and other factors that could not be anticipated or controlled by
both the national and local developmental states.
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